Religiosity in Europe: an index, factors, and clusters of religiosity by Coutinho, José Pereira
www.ssoar.info
Religiosity in Europe: an index, factors, and
clusters of religiosity
Coutinho, José Pereira
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Coutinho, J. P. (2016). Religiosity in Europe: an index, factors, and clusters of religiosity. Sociologia, Problemas e
Práticas, 81, 163-188. https://doi.org/10.7458/SPP2016816251
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
RELIGIOSITY IN EUROPE
An index, factors, and clusters of religiosity
José Pereira Coutinho
Númena, Porto Salvo, Portugal
Abstract This paper has three aims. The first aim is to measure religiosity across all European countries
through an index that combines beliefs, practices, and attitudes. The second aim is to analyse the strength of
societal factors on religiosity, including modernisation, communist rule, national identity, religious pluralism,
and religious freedom. The final aim is to group European countries by religiosity and to characterise each
cluster by dominant religions and these five societal factors. Based on EVS 2008, it was applied multivariate
analysis to reach these aims. Cluster 1 is mainly composed of Orthodox, Muslims, and Catholics; cluster 2 of
Catholics, Orthodox, and people without religion; cluster 3 by people without religion, Protestants, and
Catholics. Across clusters, the degree of human development, religious pluralism, and religious freedom
increase, while the degree of national identity decreases.
Keywords religiosity, Europe, European Values Study (EVS).
Resumo Este artigo tem três objetivos. Primeiro: medir a religiosidade em todos os países europeus através de
um índice que combina crenças, práticas e atitudes. Segundo: analisar o impacto de fatores sociais sobre a
religiosidade, incluindo a modernização, o regime comunista, a identidade nacional, o pluralismo religioso e a
liberdade religiosa. Terceiro: agrupar os países europeus pela religiosidade e caracterizar cada grupo pelas
religiões dominantes e por estes cinco fatores sociais. Com base no EVS 2008 aplicou-se uma análise multivariada
para atingir estes objetivos. O grupo 1 compõe-se principalmente de ortodoxos, muçulmanos e católicos; o grupo
2 de católicos, ortodoxos e sem religião; o grupo 3 de pessoas sem religião, protestantes e católicos. Observando
os grupos, os graus de desenvolvimento humano, pluralismo religioso e liberdade religiosa aumentam enquanto
o grau de identidade nacional baixa.
Palavras-chave religiosidade, Europa, European Values Study (EVS).
Résumé Cet article a trois objectifs. Premièrement : mesurer la religiosité dans tous les pays d’Europe, au
moyen d’un indice qui combine croyances, pratiques et attitudes. Deuxièmement : analyser l’impact de facteurs
sociaux sur la religiosité, à savoir la modernisation, le régime communiste, l’identité nationale, le pluralisme
religieux et la liberté religieuse. Troisièmement : regrouper les pays d’Europe selon la religiosité et caractériser
chaque groupe selon les religions dominantes et les cinq facteurs analysés. À partir de l’enquête EVS 2008, une
analyse multivariée a été appliquée pour atteindre ces objectifs. Le groupe 1 se composait essentiellement
d’orthodoxes, de musulmans et de catholiques ; le groupe 2 de catholiques, d’orthodoxes et de sans religion ; le
groupe 3 de personnes sans religion, de protestants et de catholiques. Quand on observe ces groupes, les niveaux
de développement humain, de pluralisme religieux et de liberté religieuse augmentent à mesure que le niveau
d’identité nationale diminue.
Mots-clés religiosité, Europe, enquête sur les valeurs des Européens (EVS).
Resumen Este artículo tiene tres objetivos. Primero: medir la religiosidad en todos los países europeos a través
de un índice que combina creencias, prácticas y actitudes. Segundo: analizar el impacto de factores sociales sobre
la religiosidad, incluyendo la modernización, el régimen comunista, la identidad nacional, el pluralismo
religioso y la libertad religiosa. Tercero: agrupar a los países europeos por la religiosidad y caracterizar cada
grupo por las religiones dominantes y los cinco factores encima referidos. Basado en el EVS 2008 se aplicó un
análisis multivariado para alcanzar estos objetivos. El grupo 1 fue compuesto principalmente por ortodoxos,
musulmanes y católicos; el grupo 2 por católicos, ortodoxos y los sin religión; el grupo 3 por personas sin
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religión, protestantes y católicos. Observando estes grupos, los niveles de desarrollo humano, pluralismo
religioso y libertad religiosa aumentan, mientras el nivel de identidad nacional baja.
Palabras-clave religiosidad, Europa, estudio de los valores europeos (EVS).
Introduction
Modern Europe’s varied cultural and religious landscape (Eisenstadt, 2000: 2) has
given rise to numerous sociological studies, which either focus on one or few coun-
tries (e.g. Fernandes, 2003; Vilaça, 2001), its Eastern part (e.g. Pickel and Sammet,
2012; Tomka, 2011), its Western part (e.g. Arts and Halman, 2004; Bréchon, 2004,
2013a) or Europe as a whole. Many of these studies of whole Europe have used sur-
vey data from the European Values Studies (EVS) (Bréchon, 2013b; Halman, 2003;
Halman and Draulans, 2006; Halman and Riis, 2002; Lambert, 2004), and other in-
ternational databases or surveys (Greeley, 2003; Pickel and Muller, 2009; Pollack,
2008; Pollack, Muller and Pickel, 2012).
Based on these studies and datasets, I propose to develop an original analy-
sis which intends to accomplish three goals. First, to measure religiosity in all Eu-
ropean countries; second, to analyse the influence of various societal factors on
religiosity; third, to group European countries by religiosity. Thus far, very few
have attempted to develop an index of religiosity for Europe as a whole: Halman
and Draulans (2006) produced one, though based on only five indicators of be-
liefs. Further, few studies explained differences in the level of religiosity. Two in-
ternational studies, which included European countries (Hollinger, Haller and
Valle-Hollinger, 2007; Norris and Inglehart, 2004), displayed some factors, albeit
with limitations: the first approached only Christian countries and had few indi-
cators in its index (two on beliefs and two on practices); the second, although in-
cluded eight indicators (four on beliefs, two on practices, and two on values), did
not produce a religiosity index and was focused in the global world. Finally, I ig-
nore the existence of any research that attempts to cluster European countries by
religiosity.
Although some scholars argue against comparing Western and Eastern
Europe with the current available indicators, I suggest that it is possible to evalu-
ate the degree of religiosity among all European countries. Tomka (2006: 262) ar-
gued that pre-modern conditions, popular piety, and communism diminished
the strength of institutionalised religion, asking for a specific approach to reli-
gion in Eastern Europe. Contrarily, I consider that some features may be used to
characterise religions across all European countries. International databases,
such as the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Values Study (EVS), the
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), and the World Values Survey
(WVS) exhibit an array of indicators that enable this task. But, instead of measur-
ing religiosity based on separate indicators, I suggest that it is necessary to build a
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complex index. In this article, I will focus on the 2008 EVS, because it is the most
complete dataset, showing values for all, except five, European countries and in-
cludes a broad set of indicators. Brill has published a few studies with the 2008
EVS data (e.g. Halman, Sieben and Van Zundert, 2012). This gave a global over-
view of European values, including religious ones, although it neither explained
nor aggregated indicators.1
Firstly, I discuss the factors that influence European religiosity. Secondly, I de-
scribe the methodological procedures, including the selection of dimensions and
indicators. Thirdly, I present and discuss results for the index of religiosity, the
importance of each factor, and the grouping of countries regarding religiosity.
Fourthly, I draw my conclusions.
Factors of religiosity
Major religion
According to Cipriani (2009), European religions have their own territory or area of
influence: Northwest is dominated by Protestantism, Southwest by Catholicism,
and East by Orthodoxy, though Islam also has a significant influence in the South-
east. The West is the territory of modern great powers, where religious hegemony
was disputed between Protestants and Catholics, recalling old quarrels between
Papacy and Empire: Scandinavian and German culture is mainly Protestant; the
Southwest is almost entirely Catholic, deeply marked by Roman culture and in
some countries by past Inquisition and military orders. The East is characterised by
the presence of empires (Eastern Roman, Ottoman, Russian, Austrian, and Soviet)
that produced cultural and religious heterogeneity, despite the prevalence of
Slavic culture and Orthodox religion.
Thus, the first question arrives naturally: how does belonging to a certain reli-
gion influences an individual’s religiosity? Here is not the place to discuss the rich
variety within each religion, so only a brief summary is provided. Each religion has
its core doctrine and rites, with Protestants being probably the most diversified,
due to historical, theological, and philosophical reasons. Muslims are perhaps the
strongest believers due to their obligation to believe in Allah and Muhammad as
messenger, the first pillar of Islam (shahada). Even if Christian religions do not im-
pose believing, the strict hierarchical organisation of Catholicism somewhat com-
mands its dogmas and doctrine to the Catholics, disallowing heterodox creed.
While the Catholic Church stands up by organisational and intellectual strength, as
well as powerful prescriptions and clear regulations, on the contrary the Orthodox
Church is dominated by informal institutionalisation and local standards (Tomka,
2006: 259). Therefore, Orthodox Church’s control is weaker, relying mostly on the
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1 The site www.atlasofeuropeanvalues.eu shows the results of EVS data, as well as WVS data, al-
lowing the preparation of European and world maps.
management of the symbolic universe through liturgy and sacraments, which may
allow heterodoxies. Protestant tradition challenges the unique and indisputable
truth promulgated by the Catholic Church. In these Churches, mainly Calvinism,
which is the furthest from Catholicism in terms of organisation, theology, and rite,
each individual follows the principle Sola Scriptura, meaning that although guided
by the authority of the Bible, every Protestant has clearance to think and to develop
his/her own beliefs.
Religious practices are also distinct among the four major European reli-
gions. Islam demands that male Muslims attend mosque every Friday, included in
the second pillar of Islam (salah). In this case, this indicator can be confusing, be-
cause it probably does not include female presence, underestimating full religious
service attendance. Orthodoxy has the richest ritualism, but attending church is
not a requirement and people do it particularly during festivals (Naletova, 2009:
386). Catholicism has probably the second richest ritualism. One of the five com-
mandments of the Catholic Church (not to be confused with the Old Testament 10
Commandments) demands Mass attendance on Sundays and holy days. In Protes-
tantism, Anglicanism has the highest degree of ritualism and Calvinism has the
lowest. For Protestantism, service attendance is not mandatory, which may well in-
duce higher absenteeism.
As James (1952: 454) put it, prayer is “the very soul and essence of religion”,
an interior dialogue between God and man. Muslims probably have the highest
frequency of prayer practice, given their obligation of praying five times daily, the
second pillar of Islam (salat). Because praying is not mandatory for Christians, they
probably pray less than Muslims. In Orthodoxy and Catholicism, the popular pi-
ety, the cult of saints and the cult of Mary, are likely to stimulate higher levels of
prayer than in Protestantism, where these cults are absent. Once again, Anglican-
ism in its High Church is closer to Catholicism than the other forms, mainly
Calvinism.
Regarding the consequential dimension, Islam has a stronger control on peo-
ple’s lives than Christian religions. The close regulation of religion on the secular
realm restrains Muslims’ behaviours and attitudes. In Muslim countries, the prac-
tices of homosexuality, euthanasia, abortion, and casual sex, are condemned by
Islamic doctrine. In Catholicism, control is not as strict as in Islam, but the ecclesias-
tical authority is still felt, especially in social contexts where Catholicism reinforces
national identity. Social control is lower in Orthodoxy, where there is a flexible ap-
plication and interpretation of canonical law: the clergy have a certain amount of
freedom to deal with controversial issues such as abortion (Naletova, 2009: 380).
Lastly, the Catholic centripetal command is wholly inexistent for Protestants, as
part of their tradition and history. One of the brands of Protestantism is the protest,
the revolt against authority and hegemonic expression. Besides this detachment
from authority, Protestantism is usually more progressive or forward-thinking
than Catholicism.
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Modernisation
The second factor is modernisation, particularly its facet of secularisation. From
the various available contributions to the paradigm of secularisation, I will fo-
cus on the theory of Norris and Inglehart (2004). In order to update the classical
theory of secularisation and to test it worldwide, Norris and Inglehart (2004:
217-223) developed a new theoretical complex of hypotheses, of which three are
relevant for this discussion. The religious values hypothesis argues that “grow-
ing up in societies in which survival is uncertain is conducive to a strong empha-
sis on religion” and vice-versa. The religious culture hypothesis suggests that
“the historically predominant religious tradition of a given society tends to
leave a lasting impact on religious beliefs and other social norms”. The religious
participation hypothesis claims that the declining importance of religion, be-
liefs, and social norms would erode regular participation in religious practices.
According to these hypotheses, the degree of secularisation influences religious
decline (beliefs, practices, and norms), which depends on the impact of reli-
gious culture: the more significant a religious culture, the less steep the reli-
gious decline.
Yet, each religious culture is unique and has different impacts on people.
Academics like Eisenstadt (2000) and Taylor (1995) regard modernity in multi-
ple ways, depending on each culture’s features. Modernity’s impact on Europe
is more observable in Protestant and Catholic societies, where industrialisation
first took place, while in Muslim and Orthodox societies economic develop-
ment began later, delaying the growth of HDI.2 As a matter of fact, of all Euro-
pean countries with very high HDI, only Greece and Cyprus are not Protestant
and Catholic, while all European countries with high or medium HDI are Or-
thodox or Muslim.3
Heelas and Woodhead (2005) have argued that in modern culture there is a
subjective turn from life-as forms of the sacred to subjective-life forms of the sa-
cred. This spiritual revolution shifts the emphasis from transcendent to inner
sources of significance and authority, empowering the individual. According to
Inglehart and Welzel (2005: 31-32), in post-industrial societies, with the loss of au-
thority, traditional religions weaken in favour of spiritual and individualised ways
of personal expression. Thus, individualisation is mainly applied to Protestant and
Catholic countries. In Orthodox and Muslim countries, besides their lower HDI,
the authority of religious institutions is higher, due to the strong bond between reli-
gion and politics. Therefore, it may explain higher values of beliefs, practices, and
attitudes for Orthodox and Muslims.
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2 HDI is the human development index and the most reliable measure of modernisation. It will be
addressed on the methodological framework.
3 HDI values of 2011. Source: UN site.
Communism and national identity
Communism is another central factor that explains Europe’s current religious land-
scape. Until twenty years ago, communism 4 ruled over the Eastern half of Europe:
Russia was communist for seventy years (1922-1991) the USSR for forty years
(1946/1952-1989/1991); Yugoslavia created an alternative communist power from
1946 to 1991-1992; Albania shaped its particular communist regime from 1944 to
1992. Orthodoxy was dominant, followed by Catholicism: eleven countries were Or-
thodox, seven were Catholic, three were Muslim, one was Protestant, and three were
mixed (one Muslim and Orthodox, one Protestant and Orthodox, and other evenly
distributed by the three Christian religions). Communism overpowered all Orthodox
countries, except Cyprus and Greece, and was less present in Protestant countries.
While in Western Europe hegemonic religion was not persecuted, in communist re-
gimes of Eastern Europe religion was ill-treated. Certainly, the impact of mobbing var-
ied by country: in Russia, Belarus, and East Germany persecution was strong, while in
countries such as Poland and Romania it was much weaker.
Besides the negative impact of communism on religion, there is another type
of impact strictly linked to national identity. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 118) con-
sider the stimulus of religiosity in ex-communist countries, where the church was
actively involved against communism. When people are oppressed by a foreign
power and the national church defends, helps, and leads the fight for independ-
ence, the conditions for religious belonging, believing, practising, and obedience
are strengthened. As Hollinger, Haller and Valle-Hollinger (2007: 137) point out, in
a nationalist popular church system, the church and its representatives help the
population to preserve their cultural identity against a foreign power that sub-
jected the country, contributing to fuse national identity and religiosity, and so
leaving the church highly regarded in popular consciousness.
Before the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the role of the Catholic
Church in fostering nationalism was stronger than that of the Orthodox Church,
while after the fall of communism the roles were reversed. For Borowik (2006: 269),
the Catholic Church “had a strong oppositional tradition in relations with the state
and strong international and organisational structures that have allowed it to de-
fend local churches from an international position”, unlike the Orthodox and
Protestant churches, where these tools to challenge communist regimes were ab-
sent. As the level of persecution, the level of subjugation versus fight against com-
munist authorities by each religion varied by country. The prominent position of
Catholicism is particularly revealed in the Baltic countries: Estonia is religiously
mixed, more Orthodox than Protestant; Latvia is evenly divided between Protes-
tants, Catholic and Orthodox; Lithuania is predominantly Catholic. Lutheran
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4 Communism subjugated several countries in the USSR (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine); in Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia); in Albania; or in the soci-
alist republics under the Soviet orbit (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia).
Estonians and Latvians religious leaders were much more willing to make compro-
mises with the Soviet authorities as opposed to the Lithuanian Catholic authorities,
who were more closely linked to national traditions and feelings (Plaat, 2003: 64).
After the fall of communism, the Orthodox link between religion and politics
was reactivated, something unknown in Catholic world. In Orthodox countries, re-
ligious pluralism promoted by communism was limited by the state at the request
of the major religion, in order to reduce competition and thereby increase its influ-
ence (Froese, 2004: 73). The Orthodox Church became a spiritual refuge and a chan-
nel of national and cultural identity, serving as the only institution that mediates
the fears and discontentment produced by the social changes that the fall of com-
munism caused (Bogomilova, 2005: 1-2). However, the conservatism of religious
organisations makes it difficult for them to adapt to new social and cultural trends,
preventing religious growth. Furthermore, decades of atheistic propaganda devel-
oped behaviours and attitudes contrary to those of religion.
National identity is also developed under non-communist regimes, when
foreign rule and/or Orthodox dominion exist. There are ten countries in this cat-
egory. Northern Ireland distinguishes itself by the foreign rule of the British and
Anglicanism until 1998. Kosovo’s case is singular: part of Serbia under commu-
nist rule, it declared independence in 2008. From this group, Greece is the only
country that did not gain independence during the twentieth century: Cyprus
(1960), Ireland (1922), and Malta (1964) became autonomous from the British
Empire; Northern Cyprus (1983) from Cyprus; Finland (1917) from the Russian
Empire; Iceland (1918) and Norway (1905) from Denmark. Although past
changes may have long-lasting impact on generations, by cutting, maintaining,
or enhancing religious transmission, the most recent changes have stronger ef-
fects on present generations. I would argue that when those ruled and their
rulers are of different religions, there is greater probability of seeing a strength-
ening of the country’s native religion due to nationalism. On the contrary, when
the religion of rulers and ruled are the same, the link between religion and na-
tionalism is broken. As a matter of fact, quite often the nationalist movements
base their doctrine in what is different from the ruler, in terms of ethnicity, cul-
ture, and religion. Moreover, the national identity is strengthened in Orthodox
countries, like Greece and Cyprus, according to the argumentation referred
above.
Religious pluralism and religious freedom
Religious pluralism and religious freedom are the final issues to discuss. For USA
scholars, market theory is the best alternative to secularisation: denominational com-
petition and state regulation of religious institutions shape religious participation for
all faiths and places (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 95). Thus, the individual chooses reli-
gion like any other product, evaluating costs and benefits in order to maximise one’s
profit (Iannaccone, 1992: 124). Competition stimulates suppliers to produce alterna-
tive faiths well adapted to consumers’ needs, contrary to state-sponsored monopoly
(Iannaccone, 1992: 128).
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Yet, Norris and Inglehart (2004: 100-103) did not find any significant relation-
ship between religious participation and both religious pluralism and freedom.
They actually found the opposite: religious homogeneity, combined with state reg-
ulation, induces higher religiosity (Norris and Inglehart, 2004: 230). The key issue
for these authors is not market theory and its assumptions but secularisation based
on human development: what produces higher and lower religiosity is lower and
higher development, respectively.
Combined with different levels of modernisation within Europe, there are
various degrees of pluralism and freedom. Nevertheless, there is a general lack
of pluralism, as a consequence of an old tradition of state religious tutelage.
Western supremacy was mainly observed in Protestant countries, where the na-
tional church did not obey any international power like in Catholicism. How-
ever, the churches’ independence in Catholic countries was lessened chiefly due
to regalist politics. Eastern supremacy is millennial: from the Roman emperor
as maximum pontiff, up to the domination of basileus and tsars over the patri-
archs of Constantinople and Moscow, a role after taken over by the general sec-
retaries of the Communist Party. In democracy, the close link between religion
and ethnic/national identity inhibited the extension of pluralism (Dietzel and
Makrides, 2009: 80).
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CONCEPT DIMENSION INDICATORS
Ideological
Belief in personal God, life after
death, hell, heaven, sin
Ritualistic
Religious services attendance
Prayer outside religious services
Consequential
Agreement on homosexuality,
abortion, euthanasia, casual sex
Communal Not adequate
Experiential Not available
RELIGIOSITY
Figure 1 Explanatory model of religiosity: concept, dimensions, and indicators
Methodological framework
Religiosity — dimensions and indicators
This study focuses on levels of religiosity among two traditional religions in Eu-
rope (Christianity and Islam). Spirituality, which is linked to the individual quest
for human development or meaning and detached from religious traditions, will
not be surveyed here, due to its limited societal expression. I will begin by defin-
ing the key dimensions of religiosity from which I will go on to produce empirical
indicators (see figure 1). First, let us consider religion as a system composed of ex-
periences, beliefs, practices, values, and organisations related to the sacred. Reli-
giosity comprises the belief in and relationship with a transcendent being, which
is mediated through a community and expressed in institutionalised practices,
attitudes, and behaviours (Fernandes, 1972: 18-19).
Religion and religiosity can be broken down into five dimensions: experiential,
ideological, communal, ritualistic, and consequential. This conceptualisation is sup-
ported by the seminal studies of Fichter (1951) and Glock and Stark (1969). Fichter
(1951) was the first to produce a multidimensional approach to religion/religiosity
composed of four dimensions: creed, code, cult, and communion. Glock and Stark
(1969) further developed this model to include five dimensions: experiential, ideologi-
cal, ritualistic, intellectual, and consequential. I haven’t included the intellectual di-
mension, due to its higher educational capital and connection to the upper social class.
Whilst these five dimensions express religiosity in its entirety, the experiential
and communal dimensions won’t be used in this study, because the EVS database
does not include indicators that can be used to assess these two dimensions. The ex-
periential dimension involves feelings, emotions, and sensations raised by the su-
pernatural (see Laermans, 2006; Simmel, 1998; Watier, 1996). Though degree of
spirituality and importance of God are the closest to this dimension, they do not
roundly reflect it, since they do not measure real experience. The communal dimen-
sion implies an affiliation to a religious group (Fichter, 1969: 173), a sense of belong-
ing, confidence, and involvement in its activities. The indicators religious belonging
and confidence in the church could be used. Yet, their use would not guarantee indi-
vidual religiosity: a religious person usually belongs and confides in the church, but
the contrary is not always true. Indeed, religious belonging depends on the interpre-
tation made by the interviewed. This interpretation may include, among others, be-
lieving in God or Allah, and/or going to church or mosque, and/or praying to God or
Allah, and/or following religious norms, and/or performing rites of passage.
Based in the remaining three dimensions — ideological, ritualistic, and con-
sequential — I select the indicators most suitable for both religions from the EVS.
The ideological dimension concerns central beliefs for each religion and valid for
all of them. Its monotheism contains as central the belief in a personal god. Beliefs
in life after death, hell, heaven, and sin extend both to Islam and Christianity. Thus,
these indicators will be applied.
The ritualistic dimension includes religious practices, embracing indicators
such as attendance of religious services and private prayer. The EVS includes one
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more indicator: moments of prayer, meditation, and contemplation. Yet, this indi-
cator is too broad to quantify traditional religiosity, being more useful as a measure
of modern spirituality.
Lastly, the consequential dimension comprises people’s attitudes in relation
to religious norms.5 According to Cipriani (2004: 304), religion is basically an agent
for diffusing values. Since the EVS presents a considerable number of potential in-
dicators, I had to apply an exploratory principal components analysis (PCA) to se-
lect the most suitable and correlated indicators. Once the indicators had been
grouped into components, I selected the most appropriate indicators to compose
the consequential dimension. From 20 quantitative indicators, belonging to the
same set of questions, the PCAproduced four components:6 sexuality and life (nine
indicators), honesty (eight indicators), genetic manipulation (two indicators) and
death penalty (one indicator).
The component of sexuality and life is the most appropriate to include as a
measure of the consequential dimension of religiosity. For example, the Catholic
Church is extremely firm in its defence of responsible sexuality, heterosexuality,
and life. On the other hand, religious leaders certainly do not need to promote hon-
esty, due to its universality, independently of religiosity. Genetic manipulation is a
more complex issue, not accessible to everyone, and its inclusion could lead to mis-
leading results. Finally, death penalty is an ambiguous and multifaceted topic,
when considering Muslim countries.
From the component of sexuality and life, I considered that five indicators
were not adequate. These were: “Taking soft drugs”: this indicator wasn’t corre-
lated with the other eight indicators and its loading is below 0.5. “Prostitution and
suicide”: both are universally rejected by religion. “In-vitro fertilisation”: this is a
complex topic which is likely to confuse participants. “Divorce”: its acceptance is
increasing, even amongst religious people, possibly due to its legislation.7 Thus, I
considered, homosexuality,8 abortion,9 euthanasia,10 and casual sex as crucial issues
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5 It is necessary to distinguish attitudes from behaviours. Usually, people that truly believe and
practise think and behave in accordance with their religion. Though, there are religious peo-
ple that do no behave following religious norms, but certainly think in an orthodox manner.
Therefore, consequential dimension has to include not behaviours but only attitudes.
6 PCA with Varimax rotation explained 56.2% of the variance; KMO = 0.922; Bartlett’s Test of Spheri-
city: 2 (190) = 367619.122, p = 0.0001. The indicators and respective loadings for each component
were the following: “sexuality and life” (homosexuality – 0.791; divorce – 0.773; abortion – 0.762;
euthanasia – 0.632; having casual sex – 0.614; prostitution – 0.604; suicide – 0.591; in-vitro fertilisati-
on – 0.525; taking soft drugs – 0.448); “honesty” (cheating on taxes – 0.740; accepting a bribe – 0.716;
lying in own interest – 0.661; avoiding fare public transport – 0.660; claiming state benefits – 0.648;
joyriding – 0.620; paying cash to avoid taxes – 0.555; adultery – 0.537); “genetic manipulation” (ma-
nipulation food – 0.813; experiments human embryos – 0.776); “death penalty” – 0.742.
7 All countries allow divorce, except the Vatican City. Here are some dates of divorce legislation:
France: 1792; Portugal:1910/1977; Italy: 1974; Spain: 1981; Ireland: 1997.
8 All European countries analysed in this study allow same-sex relationships, but only 20 countries
recognise them (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom) and only ten countries allow same-sex marriage (Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom).
to distinguish religious from non-religious people.11 The Bible and the Koran
champion responsible sexuality, the importance of marriage and family, hetero-
sexuality as a mean for procreation and coupling; and life, as gift of God.
Techniques applied and their procedures
There are three sets of analyses I undertook: developing an index of religiosity, rat-
ing the importance of each factor in it, and the grouping of countries regarding reli-
giosity. For the first set of analyses I applied PCA, a technique that allows reducing
a great array of variables into one or few components. PCA produces standardised
means (dimensions), which enable comparisons between countries. Since vari-
ables of beliefs and practices are nominal and ordinal respectively, PCA was ap-
plied only for variables related to attitudes.12 The qualitative variables were
transformed into numerical ones (using dummy variables) in order to produce
standardised means. I first extracted the dimension of beliefs by considering posi-
tive answers (“1”) on beliefs in life after death, hell, heaven, and sin, and the cate-
gory ”personal God”. Thus, the scores range from “0” (do not believe in any of the
five beliefs) to ”5” (believe in all five beliefs). Second, I obtained the dimension of
practices by adding up the variables of prayer and attendance of religious services.
The scores ranged from “2” (never) to ”14” (more than once a week/everyday).
Finally, to these three standardised dimensions PCAwas applied, which produced
the index of religiosity.13
For the second set of analyses, I used multiple linear regression (MLR) to
measure the impact of each factor on religiosity. The dependent variable was the
index of religiosity, while the independent variables were inequality-adjusted
human development index (IHDI), communist rule, national identity, religious
pluralism, and religious freedom. MLR is applied only to quantitative depend-
ent and independent variables and, in some cases, ordinal variables (Maroco,
2010: 631). To employ MLR with nominal independent variables, they have to be
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9 All European countries analysed in this study have legalised abortion, except Malta. Ireland is
the only country where abortion is only allowed to save a woman’s life. Finland, Iceland, Lu-
xembourg, Poland, and the United Kingdom are the sole countries where abortion is allowed to
save a life or due to other reasons. In the other countries, abortion is allowed on request. The first
legislation in Europe to allow abortion was the Abortion Act (1967) in the United Kingdom.
10 Euthanasia is allowed only in three European countries: Belgium (2002), Luxembourg (2009),
and Netherlands (2002). In Switzerland assisted suicide is allowed since 1942.
11 Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.768, which indicates good internal consistency.
12 KMO = 0.773; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: 2 (6) = 57857.997, p < 0.001. Communalities: homosexua-
lity: 0.633; abortion: 0.661; euthanasia: 0.579; and casual sex: 0.490. Total variance explained:
59.062%. Loadings: homosexuality: 0.813; abortion: 0.796; euthanasia: 0.761; and casual sex: 0.700.
13 KMO = 0.648; Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: 2 (3) = 45431.159, p 0.001. Communalities: dimension
of beliefs: 0.720; dimension of practices: 0.762; and dimension of attitudes: 0.533. Total variance
explained: 67.156%. Loadings: dimension of beliefs: 0.873; dimension of practices: 0.848; and di-
mension of attitudes: 0.730. When crossing the countries with indicators, dimensions, or index,
the weight was applied. For Italy, the indicator of attitude toward homosexuality was absent, so
a specific dimension of attitudes and index of religiosity was constructed.
transformed into dummy variables, as in variables “communist rule” and “na-
tional identity”.
I used only the utmost important and consistent societal indicators as inde-
pendent variables. The inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI),
produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is the HDI
(human development index) taking into account inequality. According to Norris
and Inglehart (2004: 50), HDI is the broadest summary scale of modernisation and
subsequently of secularisation. But HDI does not consider the different levels of in-
come within a population, when socioeconomic equality is critical for spreading
human security. Norris and Inglehart (2004: 16) consider that “otherwise growth
only enriches the affluent elite and the governing classes”, like in many mineral
and oil-rich nations, such as Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. In order to assess the real
spreading of secularisation, human development has to consider the level of in-
equality. To compute the HDI, health, education, and income’s average values are
“discounted” according to their level of inequality as measured by the Atkinson in-
dex. This index is based on the assumption that a society has a certain level of aver-
sion to inequality. Thus, the IHDI is the actual level of human development, while
the HDI is the potential level of human development if there were no inequality.
The IHDI is always lower than the HDI, especially with higher inequality.
For both communist rule and national identity, because there are no indica-
tors available, a dummy variable was produced (0 – without, 1 – with). For commu-
nist rule: 0.2 for Germany (about 1/5 of this country was communist until 1990). For
national identity: 0.5 for Estonia (about 1/2 of this country is Orthodox) and 0.67 for
Latvia (about 2/3 of this country is Orthodox and Catholic). For this factor, Ger-
many’s value is 0, because the current religious population of East Germany is
clearly Protestant with few Catholics. Lastly, for national identity, the value “1” is
only applied to countries included in one of the two following groups: the first in-
cludes countries under communist rule, where Catholicism and Orthodoxy were
important before and after the fall of communism respectively; the second contains
countries under foreign rule until the twentieth century with different religion
from the ruler, as well as Orthodox countries.
For religious pluralism, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) was utilised,
an indicator used by scholars as Norris and Inglehart (2004). It measures the
amount of competition among firms in a specific industry and is accounted by add-
ing the squares of each firm’s market share (s12 + s22 + … + s472). The original values
for each religion were from the EVS (2011) and were recalculated taking into ac-
count the exclusion of missing values and values of people without religion. The
values of religious pluralism (1 — sum of squares) are the following: 0.75 (low plu-
ralism), 0.75-0.85 (moderate pluralism), 0.85 (high pluralism).
For religious freedom, the four indexes of the Association of Religion Data
Archives (ARDA) were employed, inverting the original values (current value = 40
— original value). Government regulation of religion index considers the govern-
ment interference in religious freedom. In short, it determines the rights to individ-
ual practice and to the work of religious organisations, including foreign religions.
Government favouritism of religion index measures the government funding of
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religion (education, buildings, clergy, media, social assistance, and missions) and
favouritism towards a specific religion. Social regulation of religion index evaluates
the attitudes of individuals and of established religions towards new religions.
Religious persecution quantifies the people who are physically abused and displaced.
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Country Personal God Life afterdeath Hell Heaven Sin Dimension
Turkey 90.6 92.5 96.7 96.7 97.8 1.28
Malta 65.1 81.1 79.3 84.2 89.5 .89
Northern Cyprus 89.8 70.9 74.9 75.2 87.4 .88
Azerbaijan 74.4 74.1 71.8 74.7 73.3 .73
Kosovo 77.2 68.7 69.5 71.7 74.1 .69
Georgia 94.3 44.8 65.3 70.3 85.0 .68
Poland 78.5 66.1 60.8 70.7 80.9 .67
Northern Ireland 57.5 62.3 64.6 74.2 86.2 .60
Cyprus 83.4 52.6 44.6 51.5 85.1 .46
Romania 33.9 58.1 66.1 69.0 86.4 .44
Greece 69.5 48.8 47.2 51.0 76.4 .34
Ireland 53.4 59.7 42.1 67.2 67.8 .32
Moldova 43.9 49.8 55.8 58.5 80.2 .31
Bosnia Herzegovina 23.9 60.8 62.1 65.5 69.6 .28
Armenia 57.9 41.9 45.7 48.4 73.5 .20
Italy 58.9 56.9 41.4 50.3 45.8 .13
Ukraine 55.0 38.0 39.5 44.0 76.5 .13
Croatia 40.9 50.1 39.8 52.3 61.3 .08
Slovak Republic 38.4 55.2 39.2 46.2 60.1 .06
Portugal 59.0 41.3 30.5 41.2 56.9 .00
Lithuania 41.0 45.2 33.9 36.4 66.4 -.03
Iceland 39.4 61.8 15.9 41.9 55.6 -.07
Russian Federation 41.8 34.2 31.9 33.0 60.7 -.14
Great Britain 25.0 44.3 28.6 46.4 57.2 -.14
Spain 43.5 41.0 27.5 41.4 43.8 -.16
Belarus 25.5 35.3 33.9 36.3 57.9 -.21
Austria 25.7 51.6 23.8 35.9 51.6 -.21
Macedonia 36.6 34.9 32.2 35.8 45.9 -.22
Hungary 40.9 33.3 24.4 33.1 50.1 -.24
Montenegro 25.5 26.6 28.6 34.7 62.3 -.26
Switzerland 26.4 44.6 18.3 39.3 45.6 -.28
Latvia 9.0 40.5 26.5 33.0 59.1 -.31
Finland 34.0 34.0 17.2 33.7 41.6 -.35
Serbia 18.7 29.1 25.4 32.1 54.6 -.36
Netherlands 23.9 45.8 15.0 37.2 36.3 -.36
Belgium 21.6 40.4 17.1 34.0 43.9 -.37
Albania 53.0 20.8 21.0 30.1 31.6 -.37
Bulgaria 32.5 24.1 22.1 25.3 51.9 -.38
Norway 22.9 44.9 14.9 38.8 30.8 -.40
Luxembourg 27.4 40.9 17.7 25.6 36.9 -.42
Germany 21.7 34.7 16.6 30.8 42.6 -.43
France 17.6 39.3 16.6 31.6 38.9 -.44
Slovenia 22.0 32.2 16.9 28.7 40.7 -.46
Estonia 18.0 28.2 15.2 21.1 40.8 -.55
Czech Republic 10.2 23.8 15.1 18.9 38.3 -.63
Denmark 21.3 33.2 8.8 18.5 19.6 -.66
Sweden 13.7 33.9 7.6 19.0 13.3 -.73
Note: All percentages include missing values. Percentages express the answer “yes”.
Table 1 Indicators and dimension of beliefs
For the third set of analyses, clusters analysis (CA) was used to group and to
quantify countries (categories) in terms of religiosity (criterion). Major religion (Catho-
lic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim, and without religion), IHDI, communist rule, na-
tional identity, religious pluralism, and religious freedom were used as characterising
variables. For clusters analysis, usually non-hierarchical methods are more rigorous
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Country Religious services Prayer Dimension
Malta 6 7 1.02
Turkey 4 7 .78
Poland 6 6 .75
Romania 4 7 .72
Kosovo 4 6 .69
Cyprus 5 6 .58
Azerbaijan 4 7 .56
Moldova 4 6 .52
Greece 4 6 .44
Italy 4 6 .43
Ireland 5 6 .42
Armenia 4 6 .42
Northern Cyprus 3 7 .35
Georgia 4 6 .35
Bosnia Herzegovina 4 5 .35
Northern Ireland 4 6 .32
Croatia 4 5 .23
Slovak Republic 4 5 .18
Ukraine 4 5 .14
Macedonia 4 3 .01
Albania 2 5 -.01
Portugal 4 4 -.02
Serbia 4 4 -.10
Lithuania 4 3 -.11
Belarus 4 3 -.15
Austria 4 3 -.17
Switzerland 2 3 -.27
Bulgaria 4 3 -.28
Latvia 3 3 -.28
Iceland 3 3 -.29
Spain 2 3 -.29
Montenegro 3 3 -.30
Russian Federation 3 3 -.34
Luxembourg 3 2 -.34
Netherlands 2 2 -.38
Slovenia 4 2 -.38
Germany 2 2 -.39
Hungary 2 2 -.40
Finland 2 3 -.42
Belgium 1 2 -.51
Norway 2 2 -.54
Great Britain 1 1 -.57
Denmark 3 2 -.57
Estonia 2 1 -.67
France 1 1 -.73
Czech Republic 1 1 -.78
Sweden 1 1 -.81
Note: Scores of both practices express the median for each one.
Table 2 Indicators and dimension of practices
than hierarchical methods, though the application of the first type of methods presup-
poses the previous definition of the number of clusters (Maroco, 2010: 445). First, to
decide the number of clusters, I used Ward’s method by reading the graph of agglom-
eration coefficients. Secondly, I used the non-hierarchical method of K-means to
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Country Homosexuality Abortion Euthanasia Casual sex Dimension
Kosovo 9.72 9.19 9.48 9.40 .96
Turkey 9.52 9.08 8.79 9.46 .85
Armenia 9.81 8.10 8.43 9.71 .77
Azerbaijan 9.41 9.45 7.86 9.03 .74
Moldova 9.26 8.69 8.36 9.23 .73
Georgia 9.86 8.05 8.58 9.21 .72
Cyprus 8.64 8.72 9.00 8.82 .67
Malta 6.86 9.49 8.36 9.73 .61
Northern Cyprus 8.89 7.91 7.58 9.36 .53
Albania 8.91 7.81 8.31 8.74 .51
Bosnia Herzegovina 9.30 8.02 8.10 8.26 .51
Ukraine 9.40 7.59 7.31 8.49 .40
Montenegro 9.32 7.07 7.94 8.15 .39
Romania 8.82 7.30 7.80 8.68 .39
Macedonia 8.98 6.69 7.86 7.82 .30
Serbia 9.20 7.09 7.46 8.10 .30
Poland 8.16 7.73 7.63 8.02 .28
Croatia 8.60 7.49 7.00 8.30 .27
Bulgaria 8.19 6.34 6.71 8.69 .11
Latvia 8.59 7.10 6.24 7.93 .11
Russian Federation 8.80 6.66 6.64 7.64 .09
Estonia 8.65 6.71 6.33 7.96 .08
Italy n/d 7.51 6.47 8.05 .07
Lithuania 9.02 6.59 6.06 8.03 .05
Belarus 8.38 6.94 6.22 7.24 -.02
Northern Ireland 6.60 7.68 6.51 7.94 -.02
Hungary 7.81 6.21 6.55 7.62 -.07
Greece 7.12 6.84 7.63 6.62 -.08
Ireland 5.80 7.76 7.14 7.43 -.08
Portugal 6.71 6.50 6.29 8.18 -.13
Slovak Republic 5.88 6.68 6.57 7.41 -.23
Austria 5.70 6.39 6.49 7.47 -.29
Germany 5.29 6.40 6.19 7.43 -.37
Slovenia 7.04 5.17 5.49 7.60 -.39
Czech Republic 6.04 5.61 5.67 7.41 -.43
Great Britain 5.50 6.16 5.36 7.38 -.46
Switzerland 4.65 5.96 5.95 7.42 -.52
Belgium 5.24 6.01 4.24 8.03 -.55
Luxembourg 4.73 6.10 4.91 7.56 -.59
Spain 4.95 6.09 4.92 6.21 -.74
France 5.25 4.99 4.25 7.06 -.78
Netherlands 3.30 5.63 4.33 7.45 -.85
Norway 3.92 4.74 5.38 6.86 -.85
Finland 4.40 4.63 5.09 6.53 -.89
Denmark 3.72 3.55 4.21 7.12 -1.09
Iceland 2.72 5.05 5.22 5.42 -1.11
Sweden 3.19 3.27 4.46 5.26 -1.38
Note: Scores of attitudes express the average for each one.
Table 3 Indicators and dimension of attitudes
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Country Relig. IHDI CR NI RP RF
Turkey 1.20 0.542 0 0 0.005 16
Malta 1.05 0.741 0 1 0.034 30.9
Kosovo .98 0.637 1 1 0.360 21
Azerbaijan .84 0.62 1 1 0.119 14.7
Northern Cyprus .74 0.542 0 1 0.007 35.6
Georgia .74 0.63 1 1 0.143 16
Poland .73 0.734 1 1 0.042 29.2
Cyprus .70 0.755 0 1 0.065 23.3
Romania .66 0.683 1 1 0.209 17.4
Moldova .63 0.569 1 1 0.076 21.3
Armenia .56 0.639 1 1 0.079 13.4
Bosnia Herzegovina .45 0.649 1 1 0.620 15.3
Northern Ireland .41 0.791 0 1 0.559 24.9
Greece .30 0.756 0 1 0.060 16.6
Ukraine .30 0.662 1 1 0.527 20.1
Italy .28 0.779 0 0 0.027 26.3
Ireland .28 0.843 0 1 0.107 36.7
Croatia .25 0.675 1 1 0.075 25.2
Macedonia .06 0.609 1 1 0.307 26
Albania .04 0.637 1 0 0.414 35.2
Slovak Republic .03 0.787 1 1 0.200 26.1
Lithuania .01 0.73 1 1 0.126 25.4
Portugal -.06 0.726 0 0 0.119 32.2
Montenegro -.07 0.718 1 1 0.469 23.9
Serbia -.09 0.694 1 1 0.227 19.5
Russian Federation -.14 0.67 1 1 0.171 16.7
Belarus -.15 0.693 1 1 0.245 15
Latvia -.19 0.717 1 0.67 0.674 25.8
Bulgaria -.22 0.683 1 1 0.309 14.7
Austria -.26 0.82 0 0 0.222 24.8
Hungary -.30 0.759 1 1 0.389 28.9
Switzerland -.43 0.84 0 0 0.625 26.7
Germany -.47 0.842 0.2 0 0.562 24.7
Spain -.48 0.799 0 0 0.387 26.9
Great Britain -.48 0.791 0 0 0.534 24.9
Estonia -.49 0.769 1 0.5 0.583 35.6
Slovenia -.52 0.837 1 1 0.131 28.7
Luxembourg -.54 0.799 0 0 0.198 31.4
Iceland -.56 0.845 0 0 0.219 28
Belgium -.57 0.819 0 0 0.197 22.8
Netherlands -.63 0.846 0 0 0.670 29.2
Finland -.66 0.833 0 1 0.069 29.3
Norway -.72 0.89 0 0 0.193 29.1
Czech Republic -.77 0.821 1 1 0.257 26.3
France -.78 0.804 0 0 0.243 23.3
Denmark -.93 0.842 0 0 0.049 27.1
Sweden -1.18 0.851 0 0 0.167 32.7
Source: Religiosity and RP — EVS (2011); IHDI — United Nations site (values of 2011); RF — The Association of
Religion Data Archives site (average of values of 2003, 2005, and 2008).
Note: IHDI — inequality-adjusted human development index; CR — communist rule, NI — national identity,
RP — religious pluralism, RF — religious freedom. For IHDI and RF, the values of Northern Ireland and Great
Britain correspond to United Kingdom. Malta does not have IHDI, so it was used a calculation to estimate it: since
Italy is the closest country and probably the most similar culturally, using the ratio of Italian IHDI/HDI I multiply it
with Maltese HDI to find Maltese IHDI. The value of IHDI for Northern Cyprus corresponds to Turkey, the closest
country geographically. The value of IHDI for Kosovo corresponds to Albania, the closest country religiously,
geographically, and economically.
Table 4 Factors of religiosity
optimise the solution found. For bivariate analysis, when one or both variables were
nominal, I used Chi-square test (2). To apply this test, there are some premises to be
followed: a population larger than 20, all expected frequencies higher than 1, at least
80% of expected frequencies equal or higher than 5 (Maroco, 2010: 107). When at least
one of these premises is not attained, Fisher’s test (Phi) should be applied as a replace-
ment (Maroco, 2010: 111-112).
Results and discussion
Dimensions and index of religiosity
Table 1 shows the values for the dimension of beliefs. The average value is “0”, which
separates higher (above ”0”) from lower (below “0”) believing/ practising/ support-
ing/ religious people. In addition to the value of dimension by country, values per indi-
cator are also shown. Muslim Turkey has the highest value on beliefs, followed by
Catholic Malta and Muslim Northern Cyprus. The countries with ”higher belief” are
Muslim, Orthodox, or Catholic, except for Northern Ireland. Muslim countries are
clearly those with the strongest believers: from the five with the highest belief scores,
only Malta is non-Muslim. More exactly, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a mixed Muslim
and Orthodox country; and Albania is the only “less believing” Muslim country. Or-
thodox countries are higher on belief than Catholic countries, which was unexpected.
While Orthodox countries are evenly distributed between higher and lower belief,
Catholic countries are less represented in the former.
In summary, Muslim countries are the highest on belief, followed by Ortho-
dox and Catholic countries. Regarding “low believing” countries, Sweden has the
lowest value, followed by Denmark and Czech Republic. All Protestant countries
have low scores on belief, followed by Orthodox countries, Catholic countries, and
only one Muslim country (Albania).
Table 2 shows the values for the dimension of practices. Malta (Catholic) has
the highest score on this dimension, followed by Turkey (Muslim), Poland (Cath-
olic), Romania (Orthodox), and Kosovo (Muslim). As expected, Muslim and Or-
thodox participants attend less religious services, while Catholics are the most
practising. However, concerning the frequency of prayer, there are no differences
between these three religions.
In summary, Catholic and Muslim countries are the most practising, followed
by Orthodox countries. Regarding the “least practising” countries, Sweden has the
lowest value, followed by the Czech Republic, France, and Estonia. All the “least
practising” countries are Protestant or Catholic. However, Protestant countries
have always not only negative scores of religiosity but also the lowest scores (the
biggest is from Finland; Northern Ireland is a mixed country with strong specific-
ity), while Catholic countries are more indefinite with the highest score (Malta) and
one of the lowest scores (Czech Republic).
Table 3 shows the values for the dimension of attitudes. Kosovo and Turkey,
both Muslim countries, have the highest values, followed by Armenia (Orthodox),
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Azerbaijan (Muslim), Moldova and Georgia (both Orthodox). In sum, Muslim
countries have the highest scores, followed by Orthodox countries. Regarding the
lowest scores on this dimension, Sweden is the lowest, followed by Iceland and
Denmark, all Protestant countries.
Let’s now turn out attention to the index of religiosity (see table 4). Turkey has
the highest index of religiosity, followed by Malta and Kosovo. As in previous di-
mensions, the countries scoring highest are Muslim, Orthodox, or Catholic, but not
Protestant, except for Northern Ireland. Orthodox countries have higher scores
than Catholic on this index. Sweden is the least religious country followed by Den-
mark, both Protestant countries. Overall, Muslim countries are the most religious
followed by the Orthodox.
Factors of religiosity
The link between these indexes and factors of religiosity was tested through multi-
ple regression analysis. Major religion could not be included in this analysis, since
the only indicator available (religious belonging) is too ambiguous or dubious. By
looking at the main results 14 two assumptions are established: first, 65% of the vari-
ation in religiosity is explained by the variation of the five factors; second, there are
factors with positive and negative impact on religiosity. The first assumption
shows that 35% of religiosity variation is explained by other factors, such as major
religion. Regarding the second assumption, national identity is the only factor with
positive impact on religiosity. In the group of the negative impact on religiosity,
IHDI has the highest value, followed by communist rule, and by religious plural-
ism and religious freedom. These two factors are dispensable, as their values are
quite low.
The discussion will be focused on IHDI: the higher the IHDI, the lower the re-
ligiosity (see table 4). Besides IHDI, the discussion will use the other two factors
(national identity and communism). To check the impact of these two factors on re-
ligiosity two calculi were produced.15 Both these calculi pretend to express that
IHDI and the index of religiosity are directly proportional. In short, the first and the
second groups should have lower and higher religiosity respectively for the ob-
served IHDI, if IHDI was the only factor that influenced religiosity. Thus, countries
with eclectic modernisation (under the influence of this two factors) show higher
differences between observed and expected values of IHDI. If modernisation was
the only factor impacting on religiosity, the expected and observed values for IHDI
would be the same. However, the variance in religiosity is explained by the five
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14 Standardised Beta — IHDI: – 0.728; communist rule: – 0.404; national identity: 0.424; religious
pluralism: — 0.41; and religious freedom; – 0.043. Adjusted R square = 0.643. F (5, 41) = 17.548,
p = 0.000.
15 To measure expected values two calculi were applied (IR: index of religiosity): (i) IHDI positive
values: (highest value IR — observed value IR)*(mean IHDI — lowest value IHDI) / (highest va-
lue IR + lowest value IHDI); (ii) IHDI negative values: (-observed value IR)*(highest value IHDI
— mean IHDI) / (-lowest value IR) + mean IHDI.
factors in about 2/3. Therefore, countries with higher differences (with modules
over 0.06) were examined, because the impact of national identity and communism
can be explored. The countries with positive higher differences are: Malta (0.17),
Ireland (0.15), Cyprus (0.13), Northern Ireland (0.12), Poland (0.12), Italy (0.086),
and Greece (0.067). The countries with negative higher differences are: Macedonia
(-0.12), Albania (-0.095), Russia (-0.087), Bulgaria (-0.083), Moldova (-0.066), and
Belarus (-0.065).
In the first group, Catholic or Orthodox Churches were the centripetal force of
national identity: the first for Malta, Ireland, Poland, Northern Ireland, and Italy; the
second for Cyprus and Greece. Catholic Malta and Ireland, and Orthodox Cyprus
were ruled by the Anglican British Empire until the twentieth century, while Catho-
lic Poland was oppressed by a communist regime. Northern Ireland was a battlefield
where two parties were built around the Anglican and Catholic Churches. In Greece
and Italy, the only countries with values below 0.10, there were no foreign rulers dur-
ing the twentieth century, which perhaps can explain these lower values. In both
cases, I follow Norris and Inglehart (2004), who argue that the impact of modernisa-
tion weakens with a strong religious culture.
The British Empire seems to have catalysed considerable feelings of national
identity around the respective major churches: Malta (Abela, 2000: 28), as well as
Ireland (Andersen, 2010; Coakley, 2011; Inglis, 2007) and Cyprus (Dietzel and
Makrides, 2009: 80-81; Roudometof, 2009: 61). Malta is a unique case in European
modern history, where the country’s history merged with the Hospital Order of
St. John of Jerusalem during more than two hundred and fifty years (1530-1798).
Ireland is also a single case where its Celtic language and ethnicity fused strongly
with the Catholic Church. In Cyprus, the link between politics and religion was so
powerful that its first president was an Archbishop, something unthinkable in
Catholicism or Protestantism. In Northern Ireland, the conflict that opposed na-
tives to settlers, Irish to Scottish and English, was clearly of religious origins, con-
fronting Protestants and Catholics (Barnes, 2005: 67).
The Catholic identity of Poland was stimulated through its partition with
Russia and Prussia, then communist USSR and Nazi Germany, as Russians were re-
garded as Orthodox and the Germans as Protestants (Borowik, 2002: 240). Further-
more, during the last phase of communism, the Catholic Church was ruled by a
Polish pope. For Italy, its national identity is intimately linked to religion through
its history and the presence of the Vatican. Finally, Greece and Orthodoxy are
strongly linked: the Church guided the Greeks through the Ottoman period and
the war of independence, separating itself from the Patriarchate of Constantinople
and cementing its bond with the Greek nation (Molokotos-Liederman, 2003:
292-293).
In the second group, all countries are Orthodox (except Muslim Albania) and
were under communist rule. There are three possible reasons for this. First, none of
these countries is Catholic, which derailed the opportunity for a stronger commit-
ment against communism. Second, harder communist regimes broke down religi-
osity in Albania, Russia, and Belarus. Third, the weakening of Orthodoxy eroded
religiosity in Macedonia, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Belarus.
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Albania suffered a great communist persecution during forty years of the
Hoxha’s government and under Ottoman rule religion did not play any role in na-
tional liberation, which is a single case in the Balkans (Young, 1999: 7-9). Russia was
the center of communism, so religious persecution and atheistic propaganda were
particularly strong in this country. Probably, the path for communism as messianic
secular narrative was facilitated by Russian messianic thinking, supported by the
absence of individual rights during authoritarian tsarist state. Belarus suffered
great Stalinist persecution when the policy of Sovietisation was applied. Further-
more, the Belarusian Orthodox Church, though autonomous, depended on the
Russian Orthodox Church, which made it an accomplice of Russian oppression in
people’s eyes.
This weakness of Orthodoxy was also present in three other countries. In
Macedonia, the creation of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the Macedo-
nian Orthodox Church by Tito made the church further dependent upon the com-
munist state. Added to this, with the conflict of 2001 between Macedonians and
Albanians, the Constitution had to be revised in order to establish better relations
between the major ethnic groups, leading to a decrease of membership in the Mace-
donian Orthodox Church (Ivekovic, 2002: 533). In Bulgaria, the politicisation and
schism within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church largely reduced its authority and
confidence, alienating the needs and the problems of believers (Bogomilova, 2005:
15-19). Further, it competed with the political elites for influence, limiting its power
by making it financially dependent and by dividing it. In Moldova, the Moldovan
Orthodox Church’s involvement in political affairs to the detriment of sacred
things led to a loss of trust (Panainte, 2006: 95-98). As it happened, the separation of
the Orthodox Church of Bessarabia from the Orthodox Church of Moldova, and its
subsequent association with the communist government, in order to keep its hege-
monic role, provoked a decline of trust in it.
Clusters of religiosity
Results of clusters analysis are examined in figure 2. This analysis combines and re-
sumes the previous two. Three clusters were found. Cluster 1 has the highest religi-
osity (mean = 0.75), composed by 13 countries (from Turkey to Northern Ireland).
Cluster 2 shows an average religiosity (mean = 0.02) and is composed of 17 coun-
tries (from Greece to Austria). Cluster 3 has the lowest religiosity (mean = -0.62)
and is composed of 16 countries (from Hungary to Sweden). Catholics are more
represented in cluster 2, followed by cluster 3, and cluster 1 (means = 0.19, 0.35,
0.27; Phi = 1.315, p = 0.319). Protestants are prevalent only in cluster 3 (Northern Ire-
land and Latvia are the exceptions) (means = 0.03, 0.03, 0.30; Phi = 1.154, p = 0.386).
Muslims are present only in cluster 1 (Albania is the exception) (means = 0.30, 0.06,
0.01; Phi = 1.087, p = 0.566). Orthodox are only in clusters 1 and 2 (Estonia is the ex-
ception) (means = 0.39, 0.31, 0.02; Phi = 1.191, p = 0.453). People without religion in-
crease from cluster 1 to cluster 3 (means = 0.07, 0.23, 0.36; Phi = 1.393, p = 0.385). IHDI
increases from cluster 1 to cluster 3 (means = 0.66, 0.72, 0.82; Phi = 1.340, p = 0.346).
Communist rule is significantly higher in clusters 1 and 2 (means = 0.62, 0.71, 0.25;
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Phi = 0.442, p = 0.057). National identity significantly decreases from cluster 1 to
cluster 3 (means = 0.92, 0.75, 0.27; Phi = 0.638, p = 0.004). Religious pluralism in-
creases from cluster 1 to cluster 3 (means = 0.18, 0.25, 0.32; Phi = 1.390, p = 0.456). Re-
ligious freedom increases from cluster 1 to cluster 3 (means = 21.5, 24.1, 28.0; Phi =
1.266, p = 0.566).
In sum, cluster 1 is the most religious, composed of Orthodox, Muslim, and
Catholic countries, many formerly under communist rule, with the lowest degree of
IHDI, religious pluralism, and religious freedom, and the highest level of national
identity. Cluster 2 is moderately religious, being composed of Catholics, Orthodox,
and people without religion, many formerly under communist rule, with an average
degree of IHDI, religious pluralism, religious freedom, and national identity. Cluster 3
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Rel. - highest CLUSTER 1 IHDI - lowest
CR - many
NI - highest
Orthodox
Muslims
Catholics
RP - lowest
RF - lowest
Rel. - medium
CR - many
NI - medium
CLUSTER 2
Catholics
Orthodox
Without religion
IHDI - medium
RP - medium
RF - medium
Rel. - lowest
CR - few
NI - lowest
CLUSTER 3
Without religion
Protestants
Catholics
IHDI - highest
RP - highest
RF - highest
Figure 2 Clusters of religiosity for European countries
is the least religious and is composed of Protestants, Catholics, and people without re-
ligion, few formerly under communist rule, with the highest degree of IHDI, religious
pluralism, and religious freedom, and the lowest degree of national identity.
Conclusions
This study included an analysis of religion across all European countries, using the
most recent international data available. Its first goal was to measure religiosity
through an index composed of beliefs, practices, and attitudes, something never
done before. Results show that the Islamic and the Protestant countries present the
high and low points of religiosity. Turkey, Malta, and Kosovo are the most reli-
gious, while Sweden and Denmark are the least religious. Orthodox and Catholic
countries are in-between, though the first are in general more religious. Here, re-
sults and theory do not match so well, which possibly suggests that major religion
is an important factor in explaining religiosity. As a recommendation for future
studies, I suggest that at least one indicator of experiential dimension should be in-
troduced in order to increase the quality of the index of religiosity.
In relation to the second goal, the five hypothesised factors achieved to
explain 65% of variation of religiosity. This leaves the remaining 35%, which can
partly be explained by major religion and other factors not included in the current
model. Modernisation measured by IHDI is clearly the most important factor
for explaining religiosity, as theoretically predicted. According to Norris and
Inglehart (2004), higher modernisation implies higher religious decline (beliefs,
practices, and norms). However, because major religion was not included in the
model, due to the inexistence of at least one unbiased indicator in the EVS (2011),
these results must be treated with caution.
Notwithstanding the negative impact of modernisation on religiosity, there
are two other factors that may explain the differences found for levels of religiosity:
national identity and communist rule. Their contribution can be better explored
when differences between observed and expected IHDI are significant. For the
countries with positive values, only non-ex-communist countries (except Poland)
were included. The conjecture of Hollinger, Haller and Valle-Hollinger (2007) con-
cerning an association between national identity and religion was confirmed. For
all countries ruled during the twentieth century (except Greece and Italy), their
religion was different from that of the rulers. For these two countries, the strength
of their religious cultures can explain the shrinkage of modernisation’s impact
(Norris and Inglehart, 2004). This feature is also intrinsically recognisable for all
countries with a national identity linked to religion. Lastly, the Catholic national-
ism of Poland confirms assertions of Borowik (2006) and Plaat (2003), who argue
that the Catholic Church had a stronger role in fighting communism.
For the countries with negative values, all of these are Orthodox (except
Muslim Albania) and were under communist rule. None of them are Catholic,
which again confirms Borowik (2006) and Plaat’s ideas (2003). Lastly, there was a
decline in the Orthodox Church in four of six countries, which confirms the
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conjecture of the importance of a strong Orthodox Church to strengthen religiosity
(Bogomilova, 2005; Froese, 2004).
Amidst the various factors, religious pluralism and religious freedom were
the least important, indicating that level of religiosity is relatively independent
from them. However, the results reveal that lower and higher religiosity is linked to
higher and lower pluralism and freedom respectively. Thus, the conjecture of
Norris and Inglehart (2004: 230) is confirmed: there is not a significant relationship
between religiosity and religious pluralism and freedom, though countries with
hegemony and regulation are more religious.
Regarding the last aim of the paper, three clusters of religiosity were found.
The clusters integrate the previous two sets of results. The third (and the second)
set of results have the dilemma of using combined and not individual data, which
is reductive of reality and does not allow for a finer analysis by country. The degree
of religiosity and national identity decrease from cluster 1 to cluster 3, while the de-
gree of IHDI, religious pluralism and freedom increases. Ex-communist countries
are mainly in clusters 1 and 2, and few in cluster 3. Muslims are all in cluster 1 (ex-
cept Albania, due to the hard communist regime) while Protestants are only in
cluster 3. Orthodox and Catholics are equally represented in cluster 2, but the Or-
thodox are also represented in cluster 1 but not in cluster 3, while Catholics are
poorly and well represented in clusters 1 and 3 respectively. The number of people
without religion increases from cluster 1 to cluster 3.
This study has a number of novelties. First, I ignore other studies that jointly ana-
lysed religiosity, the factors that affect it and its clustering. Second, it upgraded other
studies concerning religiosity and related societal factors, since it included all Euro-
pean countries. Third, the index of religiosity is reliable, even if it can be improved.
Fourth, it is the first studytogroupEuropeancountriesbyreligiosity.Thebroadnessand
methodological thoroughness of this study presents a more accurate and comprehen-
sive portrait of European religiosity reality and the societal factors that command it.
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